Efforts to limit cumulative emissions over the next century may be partially thwarted by the responses of fossil fuel suppliers. Current price-cost margins for major reserves are ample, leaving scope for significant price reductions if climate policies reduce demand for fossil fuels through conservation or substitution to clean alternatives. Most models simulating the consequences of climate policies completely disregard these supply responses. As for theoretical models, under standard assumptions they predict such strong supplier responses that climate policies may have no effect on cumulative emissions and may even leave society worse off, suffering damages from global warming sooner and with less time to adapt (the "green paradox").We contribute to this literature by developing a richer theoretical model that takes account of the different extraction costs and emissions rates of different fossil reserves. We use this model to compare the qualitative effects of four policy options: accelerating cost reductions in the clean backstop technologies, taxing emissions, improving energy efficiency, and a clean fuel blend mandate; we also discuss the consequences of mandating carbon capture and sequestration. All policies can reduce cumulative emissions, but the backstop policy accelerates emissions while conservation policies (energy efficiency or blend mandates) delay emissions. We then calibrate the model using data on costs, reserves, and emissions factors for five major categories of oil. Using this calibrated model, we estimate the intertemporal leakage rate-the percentage error in cumulative emissions reductions that would arise if no account is taken of the supply responses of oil producers. We find that conservation policies can have higher intertemporal leakage rates and backstop policies can have lower leakage than an emissions tax. Leakage rates generally decline as the policies become more stringent.
Introduction
Reducing emissions of the greenhouse gases (GHGs) that contribute to global climate change is the greatest collective action problem of our time. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), stabilizing carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) concentrations at levels that would avoid the largest risks of climate change could require global emissions to peak in the next 20 years (IPCC 2007) . At the same time, the current United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, under the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities," requires no mandatory action on the part of developing countries, including major emerging economies that are large emitters. Furthermore, in the absence of a binding successor to the Kyoto Protocol, not even developed countries are committed to emissions targets, although the Copenhagen Accord does call on countries to make individual pledges of action.
In this context of largely uncoordinated activities, several countries are taking significant steps to reduce their own GHG emissions. However, an important concern for unilateral movers is that their efforts may be partially (or completely) undermined by the actions of others. Two channels of "carbon leakage" have been identified: spatial and intertemporal. With spatial leakage, the attempt by one government to raise the cost of fossil fuel use may drive economic activity toward unregulated, lower-cost countries. This type of leakage is likely to be small (a few percentage points) in terms of overall reductions.
We focus on the other channel of carbon leakage-the offsetting intertemporal responses of oil suppliers to a government's attempts to curb fossil fuel usage. Current price-cost margins for some of the world's largest reserves are ample, so there is scope for significant price reductions if clean substitutes eventually become cheap enough to threaten to lure consumers away from fossil fuels. 1 Moreover, since such fuels are in finite supply, current extraction decisions depend not only on current prices but also on future prices. If climate policies make selling fossil fuels in the distant future less attractive, suppliers may prefer instead to sell more in the present. Early studies of this phenomenon, termed the "green paradox," predicted that intertemporal leakage would reach 100 percent. We conclude that intertemporal leakage can be considerably smaller, particularly as policies get more ambitious.
Asked by Foreign Policy, "How can we stop climate change?" Bjorn Lomborg (the "Skeptical Environmentalist") replied, "By being smart and investing in research to make green energy cheap instead of trying to make oil unaffordable" (Dickenson 2010 ). Although such a policy might address some spatial leakage concerns, the prescription has been criticized in studies of the green paradox. Notably, Sinn (2008) , who coined the term, argues that alternative energy strategies are particularly likely to accelerate rather than slow emissions over time. This acceleration can not only obviate any emissions reductions in the long run but also increase the present discounted value of damages (the "strong" version of the green paradox). In contrast, extraction taxes can at least be designed to slow fossil fuel consumption. But he argues more generally that policies to promote energy efficiency or to expand the use of clean substitutes are destined to speed global warming, whereas carbon sequestration is one of the few useful options for slowing it.
Other authors are more or less pessimistic about the prospects for clean energy policies. Strand (2007) makes a similar point about the indirect effects of reducing the cost of substitute technologies. Winter (2011) notes that with positive feedback effects between atmospheric carbon and the release of terrestrial carbon, innovation in clean energy technology can lead to a permanently higher temperature path. Grafton et al. (2010) find that subsidies to biofuels that are ongoing substitutes for fossil fuels may accelerate or delay extraction, depending on the relative cost parameters. Chakravorty et al. (2011) show that greater potential for learning-by-doing in the substitute technology results in lower equilibrium energy prices, which deter innovation, leading to increased resource extraction and greenhouse gas emissions. Other studies have combined the analysis of intertemporal and spatial emissions leakage. Hoel (2011) extends this 1 A variety of studies using static computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have shown the sensitivity of leakage to fossil fuel supply elasticities (e.g., Burniaux and Martins 2000; Mattoo et al. 2009 ). Most of these studies find leakage rates in the range of 10 to 30 percent (Babiker and Rutherford 2005) , representing both changes in fossil fuel markets and the shifting of other economic activities.
analysis by assuming that countries differ in their taxation of fossil fuel use. Eichner and Pethig (2009) use a two-period model with separate abating, nonabating, and fossil fuel-supplying countries to explore the conditions under which tightening the emissions cap in the abating country accelerates global emissions.
In all of these models, the nonrenewable resource is ultimately exhausted, albeit at different rates; the cumulative carbon emissions are thus constant and the intertemporal leakage rate is 100 percent. Cumulative extraction is invariant in these models because of a combination of assumptions made about the extraction technology and green substitute, and because the policies considered fall within a range that would not choke off fossil fuel demand.
In reality, extraction costs will rise as fossil fuels become increasingly scarce, so reasonable climate policies can cause low-value resources to be left in the ground. In principle, this may be modeled either by positing a functional form for extraction costs that includes cumulative extraction as one argument or by assuming that different pools of oil have different per unit costs. Gerlagh (2011) and Van der Ploeg and Withagen (2010) adopt the first approach.
Gerlagh assumes that extraction costs are linear in cumulative extraction and finds that lowering the cost of a green substitute decreases cumulative emissions but still increases initial emissions-an effect he terms a "weak green paradox." Van der Ploeg and Withagen also assume that extraction costs increase with depletion and posit a range of costs for clean backstop technologies; they find that the green paradox still holds with cost reductions in expensive backstop technologies, but it need not arise with cost reductions in relatively cheap backstops.
In this paper, we adopt the second approach. We assume that oil pools differ in their per unit cost of extraction, and hence extraction costs will rise over time as higher cost pools are accessed. This framework retains intuitive characteristics of the early studies and also allows us more flexibility when calibrating our model than if we had assumed a particular form of the cost function. In addition, it allows us to take account of the different emissions factors associated with the different types of fossil fuels, previously ignored in the literature.
We investigate the effects of four distinct climate policies:
1. accelerating the decline in costs of a carbon-free backstop technology; 2. taxing emissions; 3. improving energy efficiency; and 4. mandating a blend or portfolio ratio with the backstop technology.
Since the cost of implementing some of these (such as the first and third policies) is unknown, as is the damage resulting from a given path of cumulative emissions, assessing the welfare consequences of the different policies is impossible. Instead, we require each policy to meet a given cumulative emissions target and compare the effects of the different policies on two summary measures: (1) the time interval before green technology replaces fossil fuels; and (2) the degree of intertemporal leakage. The first metric relates to the weak green paradox; other things equal, policymakers may prefer longer time intervals to adjust to a given level of cumulative emissions. We show that, regardless of the number of pools assumed and their sizes and costs, the four policies can be ranked unambiguously in this dimension: for any given level of cumulative emissions, the green backstop policy results in the least time to adapt, followed by the emissions tax, but the energy efficiency and blend mandate policies actually have identical effects and give society the longest time to adapt. The same rankings persist even if we assume that each conservation policy changes over time or that the emissions tax rises over time at the rate of interest.
For our second metric, we define the intertemporal leakage rate in a similar manner to the conventional spatial leakage rate: what is the change in emissions resulting from the rent adjustment as a share of the reductions that would occur in the absence of rent adjustment? We thus shift focus from the time path of emissions, the emphasis of the prior literature on the green paradox, to the effectiveness in generating cumulative reductions. The reasons are threefold.
First, it is not clear that the social cost of carbon rises more slowly than the discount rate, which is necessary to prefer delaying emissions. 2 Second, given the longevity of carbon effects, the stabilization targets that are the focus of international negotiations are tantamount to a cumulative carbon budget over the fossil fuel era. 3 Third, quantifying the extent of intertemporal 2 Although considerable uncertainty surrounds the true nature of the carbon damage function, the more thorough recent attempts to quantify it find the social cost of carbon to be essentially proportional to GDP (Golosov et al. 2011) . While real GDP growth may typically be lower than real interest rates, it can be higher than the social discount rates used in climate valuation. Nordhaus (2007) calculates a social cost of carbon that rises at 5.5% per year, using a subjective discount rate of 1.5%. Anthoff et al. (2011) find that the social cost of carbon increases by 1.3% to 3.9% per year, with a central estimate of 2.2%. 3 In a recent review of studies of the atmospheric lifetime of CO 2 , Archer et al. (2009) find a "strong consensus" across models of global carbon cycling that "the climate perturbations from fossil fuel-CO 2 release extend hundreds of thousands of years into the future." They further cite evidence that "the radiative impact of a kilogram of CO 2 is nearly independent of whether that kilogram is released early or late in the fossil fuel era." leakage is important since most climate policy models currently take no account of the dynamic responses of fossil fuel suppliers to policy changes. 4 According to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, to reach a stabilization target of 450 parts per million (ppm) would require cumulative emissions over the 21st century to be in the range of 1370 to 2200 GtCO 2 (or 375 to 600 GtC; IPCC 2007, p. 67) . 5 In comparison, Kharecha and Hansen (2008) estimated that there remain 70 to 140 GtC of natural gas, 120 to 250 GtC of conventional oil, 500 to 1,000 GtC of coal, and 150 to 1,000 GtC of unconventional oil from sources like tar sands and shale. Especially if the upper range of reserve estimates holds, complete exhaustion of all proven resource pools, regardless of the time scale, would constitute a flagrant disregard for the GHG concentration targets.
Climate policy models suggest that significant policy changes will be required to achieve these targets. Estimates of intertemporal leakage will allow us to correct such forecasts by taking into account the supply responses that these models neglect. To gauge the magnitude of intertemporal leakage, we use a calibrated model of oil to compare the equilibrium effects under each policy with what would happen if scarcity rents did not adjust. 6 In particular, we find that the alternative energy policy is no more susceptible to intertemporal leakage than the emissions tax, although all policies suffer high rates of leakage at modest reduction targets.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe a stylized one-pool model. In Section 3, we characterize the effects of the policies, each of which has been widely discussed as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In Section 4, we compare the consequences of these policies with respect to the time to transition to the backstop technology and generalize our analysis to n pools and time-varying policy paths. In Section 5, we use a calibrated version of the model to quantify intertemporal leakage rates associated with each policy. Section 6 discusses some limitations to conducting welfare analysis, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
Single-Pool Model
We begin by reviewing the behavior of the one-pool model in the absence of policy interventions. Suppose we have a single pool of oil of stock size ( S ) with a constant per unit extraction cost (c), sold in a competitive market. A carbon-free backstop technology is available in unlimited capacity at constant marginal cost, but it is initially too expensive to warrant consideration by consumers. 
9 For clarity of exposition, in these sections we ignore any time trend in the demand function. However, in the parameterized numerical simulations, we will allow for demand growth.
We then have two potential regimes, or types of equilibria. In regime (a), the pool of oil is fully exhausted (all of the oil eventually ends up above ground). In this case, the per unit value of oil in the ground is strictly positive ( 0),
 
and cumulative demand must equal the resource stock. Formally, we have two equations defining the two endogenous variables ( , ) :
(1) ( ; ) . 
In regime (b), the pool of oil is incompletely extracted (some oil remains below ground). In this case, the shadow value of oil must be zero ( 0)   , and the share extracted,  , is determined by cumulative demand up to the switchover point. The following two equations define the two endogenous variables ( , ) :
( ; ) . 
Policies Intended to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Next we introduce each of the four policies and analyze its effects in the simple one-pool model. To simplify, we assume that each policy is exogenously imposed 10 and fully anticipated. 11
Accelerating Backstop Cost Reductions
Consider first a policy that accelerates cost reductions in green backstop technologies after the first instant. That is, (0; ) B z is constant regardless of z,
Assume that z increases above z 0 by so little that the pool would still be exhausted. An increase in z will cause the backstop marginal cost to decline faster. If the price path did not change, the transition to the clean technology would occur sooner. But then the oil would not be exhausted, a disequilibrium. To restore equilibrium, the scarcity rent must decline, and as a result, the entire price path falls, as Figure 2 depicts. Strengthening the policy thus lowers the rents on the resource and results in an earlier transition ( B x falls). In this regime the green paradox arises:
faster reductions in the unit cost of the green technology do not reduce cumulative emissions (100 percent leakage), but the policy shortens the time until fossil fuels are exhausted and therefore raises the annual rate of emissions during the remainder of the fossil fuel era.
If the innovation rate (z) becomes large enough that the rents are driven to zero, we enter regime (b). Oil would then sell at its marginal cost of extraction until the backstop enters. Faster innovation will not alter the price, but it does hasten the transition to the green technology (smaller B x ). It therefore increases the stock of reserves that remain in the ground rather than being transformed into greenhouse gases. Note that in regime (b), increasing z does not alter the rate of extraction, so both the weak and strong versions of the green paradox disappear.
10 That is, we ignore the possibility that energy prices may themselves induce changes in energy efficiency or backstop R&D, or that CCS would be induced by the tax. 11 A fifth policy, mandating carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) has a different relationship between cumulative extraction and cumulative emissions and is treated in the Appendix. 
Emissions Tax
An emissions tax levies a cost  per unit of emissions at time t. For concreteness, we assume extractors pay the tax; however, the incidence would be the same if instead we had assumed that buyers pay the tax. For this single-pool model, since the emissions rate is invariant, If the tax is just large enough to drive the scarcity rent to zero, the entire pool will still be exhausted (  1) . The boundary of regime (b) has been reached. The price consumers pay remains constant at c   until they switch to the backstop because it has become cheaper. The higher the tax, the higher the price consumers pay for oil, the sooner they switch to the green backstop (smaller B x ), and the smaller is utilization of the pool (smaller  ). 
Improvements in Energy Efficiency
An alternative to promoting green substitutes or taxing emissions is to reduce the demand for oil by increasing the efficiency with which it is utilized. Examples include retrofit programs for buildings, energy efficiency standards for appliances, and fuel economy standards for motor vehicles. Efficiency (denoted  ) is measured in energy services per BOE. An improvement in this efficiency of utilization (an increase in  ) has two countervailing effects:
(1) it reduces the number of barrels required to obtain any level of energy services; but (2) (larger) increase in the demand for services, the demand for oil would shift inward (outward). In fact, the elasticity of the demand for services is small, so improvements in efficiency result in an inward shift in the demand for oil.
To clarify this discussion, we must distinguish between demand for energy services (denoted v ) and the demand for oil (denoted q ). Let p  falls and more of them will be consumed. To compute the derived demand for oil, invert the first-order condition to obtain the following:
is the demand for energy services (for policies that do not change energy efficiency, 1
  , and we simply have D(p)). Differentiating, we conclude that
is the elasticity of demand for energy services. Thus, an increase in efficiency cuts the demand for oil if and only if the magnitude of the elasticity of demand for services is smaller than 1. In that case, the rebound effect is dominated. Since the rebound effect is estimated to be smaller than 10 percent, we assume that 1   . 12 Therefore, improved efficiency causes the demand for oil to shift inward at any price.
To determine the effect of increased energy efficiency on the equilibrium price path, we must modify equations (1) and (3) representing cumulative extraction:
Equations (2) and (4) require no modification; as before, consumers switch from fossil fuels to the green backstop when the backstop becomes the cheaper energy source. Indeed, since the backstop price ( B(t; z 0 ) declines to the marginal cost of extraction ( c) at the same date independent of the position of the demand curve, the switchover from fossil fuels to the clean backstop throughout regime (b) always occurs at the same date ( x B ).
In regime (a), improvements in energy efficiency decrease demand for oil and result in a price path that is uniformly lower. If the price path did not fall, the cumulative demand up until the switchover point would be less than the stock. Thus, to continue to exhaust the resource pool, the scarcity rent falls and the transition to the backstop occurs later. Emissions are postponed, but exhaustion still occurs.
If the efficiency improvements are sufficiently large, we reach the boundary with regime (b), where the scarcity rent is just driven to zero, but nonetheless the entire high-cost pool is exhausted. However, further strengthening of energy efficiency policy has effects distinct from those of the previous policies. 
Blend Mandate
A blend mandate would require that, for every unit of fuel supplied, a certain minimum percentage  must come from the green substitute at time t, and the remainder may come from oil. This mandate is similar to a renewable fuel standard or renewable portfolio standard. The policy combines some of the effects of the emissions tax-paid in the form of a cost premium for the mandated share of energy from the backstop source-and some of the effects of the energy efficiency policy, since fossil fuels are being displaced in a given level of energy services with the backstop.
To sell its product, an extractor must blend one barrel of fossil fuel with / (1 )    barrels of the backstop, and then sell the resulting 1 / (1 )   barrels of the blended product at price t p per barrel of blend to obtain p t / (1  ) per unit extracted. The extractor chooses the number of barrels to extract and blend each period to maximize the following:
So while the extractor is operating, the price must itself equal a weighted average of the two energy source costs: p(t)  (1  )(c  e rt )   B(t;z 0 ). Meanwhile, at any given price, only a fraction of the demand for barrels of blend is fulfilled by the fossil energy source: (1) and (3), representing cumulative extraction in those regimes, must be modified:
Figure displays the price paths of the two regimes with the blend mandate. The mandate functions in part like a tax, raising costs and tilting the price path flatter as it becomes more stringent. However, when the backstop price declines over time more quickly than the blend mandate rises (as it does by definition with the fixed blend mandate), the implicit tax also declines over time, resulting in a declining price path in the more stringent policy regimes. Larger blend requirements decrease demand for oil both by displacing oil and by raising the initial price. In regime (a), however, the price path cannot lie uniformly above the no-policy path, else cumulative extraction would be less than the stock. Hence, the new price path must cross the NP (or less stringent policy) path. Consequently, the switch to the backstop must occur later. As with the energy efficiency policy, emissions are postponed, but exhaustion still occurs.
With a sufficiently large blend mandate, we reach the boundary with regime (b), where the scarcity rent is just driven to zero, but nonetheless the entire pool is exhausted. Regime (b) is emissions. This analysis also gives intuition in comparing policies in the n pool case.
First, consider the effects of each policy on the backstop switchover time associated with a given level of cumulative extraction (and therefore emissions), S  . For simplicity, we assume that demand is time invariant, which allows for easy expressions of the stock equations (3).
For example, with the backstop policy, the improvement rate z must be at a level such that, up until the switchover time, cumulative demand at the unit cost of oil equals the target level of extraction, or
With a tax, then, we know that the consumer price of oil is higher than the unit cost, meaning that demand is lower in every time period up to the switchover point, and so to meet the same cumulative extraction, that switchover point must come later than with the backstop policy. That is,
The transition under the energy efficiency policy occurs when the backstop unit cost, without accelerated improvements, declines to the unit cost of oil. The transition under the blend policy occurs when the weighted average of (1) the unit cost of extraction and (2) the backstop unit cost equals the backstop unit cost. But this can occur only if the two components to be weighted are equal to each other:
B E x trade-off curves for the energy efficiency and blend-mandate policies coincide, and this result is robust to alternative specifications. 13 The stringency of either conservation policy does not affect the switchover point; it simply determines the cumulative quantity of oil demanded until the switch occurs, which equals the extraction target.
Because the unit cost of oil is less than the cost inclusive of an emissions tax, the point where backstop and oil costs converge under conservation policies must be later than with the tax. That is,
Thus, we have a complete ranking for a given level of cumulative extraction: the timing of the transition to the backstop fuel is soonest for the backstop policy, then the tax policy, and last for the conservation policies, which have identical effects on that timing. That is,
Figure 6 confirms this, by plotting cumulative emissions against B x for each policy. We observe that in regime (a), the backstop policy causes an earlier switch, but the tax delays it, and the energy efficiency and blend mandates delay the transition even more. In regime (b), the backstop and tax policies bring the transition time forward monotonically, but they do not cross, but the energy efficiency and blend policies have no effect on the timing. 13 The same considerations establish that in the n pool case, the transition from the marginal pool m  n to the backstop under the energy efficiency policy and under the blend policy occurs on the identical date. Indeed, the argument implies that even if the two policies are time-varying, their trade-off curves coincide.
Figure 6. Cumulative Emissions and Switchover Timing with One Pool
By this ranking of B x , the conservation policies (energy efficiency and the blend mandate) delay more consumption, whereas the backstop policy leads to the highest average emissions during the extraction period, given a cumulative emissions target.
Extension to Multiple Pools
With n > 1 pools, if the per unit costs of extraction differ, they will be extracted in order of their extraction costs (Herfindahl 1967) . Moreover, in the equilibrium, a pool with a lower extraction cost will have a higher scarcity rent. Let k x denote the date of transition from pool k -1 to the pool k. The set of equations defining these endogenous variables is described in Section A1 of the Appendix.
Suppose we gradually tighten one of the policies considered previously. Then the equilibrium will fall successively into each of 2n qualitative regimes R R R R . In any regime (a), every pool that is utilized will ultimately be exhausted and the associated scarcity rents will each be strictly positive. Strengthening the policy in a regime (a) causes the rents to decline until the lowest rent reaches zero. Further strengthening of the policy moves the equilibrium into a regime (b). In such regimes, the last pool utilized has a zero scarcity rent and will (except for the boundary case) be only partially exhausted. Further strengthening of the policy within regime (b) crowds out extraction of the marginal pool; scarcity rents for the inframarginal pools can be further eroded by policies that influence demand. When the resource Remarkably, across all the regimes, these three transition trade-off curves touch but never cross, permitting us to rank the policies. It is easy to show that the changeover from , R an increase in the tax rate delays the start point of extraction from the marginal pool. Hence, if both policies induce an equilibrium with the same marginal pool partially utilized and replaced at the same instant by the backstop, the emissions tax must generate smaller cumulative emissions than the backstop policy. Consequently, the two trade-off curves cannot cross, and we retain the same relative ranking as with the single pool.
Extension to Time-Varying Policies
We have seen that the ranking of the transition trade-off curves of the four policies remains the same regardless of the number of pools available to the extractors. In preparation for our simulations, we note that the ranking also remains unchanged for the time-varying policies we will consider. The backstop policy was already assumed to be time-varying. Suppose the energy efficiency policy varies over time such that the demand for oil is nonstationary ( is weakly increasing and a monotonic function over time). It remains true that in every regime (a) some pool (m) will be the highest-cost pool to be utilized (the "marginal pool") and the transition trade-off curve will have a horizontal segment at a height equal to It remains to discuss the effects of introducing nonstationarities in the emissions tax. Because tax paths have received prior attention, 15 we confine our attention to the case in which the initial emissions tax is set by the policymaker at  and is then raised at the rate of interest, such that  (t)   e rt . This path corresponds to the optimal tax for meeting a cumulative emissions constraint. If the policy is stringent enough that m is the marginal pool, then the induced price path is continuous, consisting of m strictly convex regimes separated by kinks (with the left derivative strictly larger than the right derivative). In regime (a), when exhaustion of the mth pool remains complete, the shadow values simply absorb the tax cost of the last pool and B x remains unchanged; the switchover is neither delayed nor accelerated. 16 , an increase in  shifts the price path faced by consumers upward uniformly. Since at higher prices it takes longer to exhaust each inframarginal pool, each transition to the next pool occurs later and cumulative depletion from the marginal pool is smaller. When the tax is sufficiently high, that pool is never utilized and the next most costly pool becomes the marginal pool.
15 As Sinn (2008) and Hoel (2012) point out, the time path of emissions fees or extraction taxes matters for the present discounted value of emissions, given a cumulative emissions outcome. An optimal emissions tax path would need to account for dynamics, damages, discounting, and the possibility of a time-inconsistency problem. 16 As shown in Appendix A2, if pool m is marginal in regime (a), then the equilibrium price path is . m      . If  is marginally higher, the individual multipliers will decrease so that each term in square brackets remains unchanged; since lower-cost pools have higher multipliers but are assumed to have lower emissions factors, larger multipliers must decrease by less than smaller multipliers and the order of the multipliers is preserved. It is straightforward to verify that this hypothesized new assignment of multipliers generates a competitive equilibirum: since the magnitude of the terms in each square bracket is unchanged, the price path would be unchanged and cumulative demand for the reserves in each pool would still equal the stock in each pool. Moreover, as asserted in the text, the switchover to the backstop would occur on the same date.
Since the transition trade-off curve that results as  varies has no horizontal segments in regime (a), B x decreases monotonically as E falls. Since the transition trade-off curve common to the time-varying energy efficiency and blend policies is nondecreasing as E falls, that curve cannot intersect the trade-off curve for the backstop policy except at the point representing no policy. Finally, as in the non-time-varying case, the transition trade-off curve for the timevarying emissions tax also has no nontrivial intersection with that of the backstop policy. For any common transition time with positive policy levels, cumulative demand and therefore emissions must be smaller with the time-varying emissions tax than the backstop policy. Hence, these two trade-off curves cannot cross and the ranking of the four policies remains unchanged even if they vary over time as described above.
Comparing Intertemporal Leakage Rates
The fundamental problem of the green paradox is the acceleration of consumption that arises from falling scarcity rents. The transition trade-off curves compare average annual emissions during the period of exploitation, a measure of the speed of emissions along the path. Although this measure takes into account the effects of scarcity rent equilibration, it also includes policy-induced changes in the emissions path that would occur in the absence of rent adjustments. Indeed, since all policies reduce scarcity rents, all policies also suffer from the weak green paradox, as initial emissions are higher than they would be if rents did not adjust. The difference is, for all but the green backstop policy, the direct effects of the climate policies on consumption outweigh the effects of the rent adjustment.
An alternative perspective is to focus on the degree of intertemporal leakage-that is, the magnitude of the additional emissions reductions under each policy that would arise if rents did not re-equilibrate but instead remained fixed at their no-policy levels. This alternative perspective has practical value, since one can adjust the forecasts of the predicted reduction in cumulative emissions made by models that do not account for adjustments in scarcity rents. To assess the potential magnitudes of intertemporal leakage, we simulate the effects of each policy using a model calibrated to reflect real-world data. All policies suffer from intertemporal leakage, and the rankings can be quite different from those of the transition trade-offs.
Parameterized Five-Pool Model
We draw on the literature to parameterize a multiple pool model reflecting the five major types of oil: Middle East and North African (MENA) conventional oil, other conventional oil, enhanced oil recovery (EOR) and deep-water drilling, heavy oil bitumen (including oil sands), and oil shales. This level of disaggregation is sufficient to capture the effects. For each pool, we specify the size, per unit cost, and emissions factor. On the demand side, we draw on empirical estimates of demand elasticity and projections of demand growth over time.
Estimates of oil reserves and costs vary widely. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) currently estimates global proven reserves to be about 1,200 billion barrels (including conventional and some unconventional, like Canadian oil sands). Kharecha and Hansen (2008) report reserves estimates in GtC, which if converted to billion barrels of oil equivalent (BBOE) range from 1,000 to 2,100 BBOE of conventional oil and 1,300 to 8,500 BBOE of unconventional oil. Aguilera et al. (2009) include projections of future reserve growth, leading to estimates of conventional oil reserves of 6,000 to 7,000 billion barrels available at prices as low as $5 a barrel, heavy oil reserves of 4,000 billion barrels at $15 per BOE, oil sands reserves of 5,000 billion barrels at $25 per BOE, and up to 14,000 billion barrels of oil shale that could be tapped at $35 per BOE. For our purposes, we draw rough estimates from the fall 2010 International Energy Agency (IEA) report, which gives a range of production costs and available reserves by oil type.
Our specific reserves and cost assumptions are given in Table . To convert to CO 2 emissions (right column), we assume (as suggested by U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) that a barrel of oil contributes 0.43 tons 17 of CO 2 and adjust for the fact that different unconventional sources have larger emissions factors relative to conventional oil. 18 The assumed initial backstop marginal cost is drawn from a range of common estimates of biofuels, in line with the IEA estimates; although conventional biofuels like sugarcane ethanol are currently cheaper, the second-generation fuels like cellulosic ethanol and biodiesel-which have greater potential for the larger-scale supplies needed to function as backstop technologieshave higher costs. 19 For this exercise, we assume that backstop costs start at $100 and will ultimately asymptote to $10 (i.e., be lower than conventional oil in the far future), following a modest no-intervention cost reduction rate of 0.25 percent per year of the excess over the longrun cost (z = 0.0025). The combination of these cost assumptions ensures that all oil resources will be fully exhausted by the end of the century in the absence of policy interventions. We assume that the backstop fuels are nonemitting. 20 Although we draw on biofuels in making these cost estimates, we recognize that future backstops could include other options, like hydrogen or clean electricity for plug-in vehicles. 21 For the demand side of the simulation model, we parameterize a linear demand function. According to EIA, global annual oil consumption has been roughly 86 million barrels per day in recent years, or an annual consumption of 31.4 billion barrels. 22 We assume an effective elasticity of -0.25. This value roughly corresponds to the median estimate of a global oil demand elasticity from Kilian and Murphy (2010) . Earlier estimates of the price elasticity of demand for gasoline (primarily in the United States) find short-term demand elasticities of about -0.25 and long-run elasticities of about -0.6 (Espey 1996; Goodwin et al. 2004 ). On the other hand, Cooper (2003) and Dargay and Gately (2010) find much lower price elasticities of demand (-0.15 and smaller) when considering a broader array of countries, particularly non-OECD countries, and more recent time periods. However, Kilian and Murphy (2010) warn that most studies of such elasticities using dynamic models have been econometrically flawed by not accounting for price endogeneity. 19 In 2007, the U.S. Department of Agriculture estimated cellulosic ethanol production costs at $2.65 per gallon, compared with $1.65 for corn-based ethanol. 20 We acknowledge that the actual emissions factors for biofuels, particularly those associated with land-use changes, are controversial. 21 Of course, synthetic fuels derived from coal or natural gas could also be substitutes, but we assume fossil-based backstops are precluded. 22 http:// tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=54&aid=2.
EIA's International Energy Outlook 2010 projects global demand to increase 49 percent from 2007 to 2035, or about 1.45 percent per year, primarily from developing countries. We incorporate demand growth by assuming that the linear demand curve shifts out at this rate without changing slope. We position the initial demand curve such that (1) it passes through the quantity 31.4 BBOE; (2) it has a point elasticity at that quantity of -.25; and (3) the initial price on the equilibrium price path in the base (no policy) case induces a quantity demanded of 31.4 BBOE.
Our simple Hotelling model predicts a competitive market price that starts at $41 per barrel. It does not explain the simultaneous exploitation of high-cost resources alongside lowcost ones or current $75 per barrel prices. 23 However, our modest additions do lend a great deal more realism to a model that still allows for the kinds of green paradoxes explored in the literature. Figure 7 displays the no-policy price path indicated by the five-pool model. We see that differentiating among more pools leads to a smoother price path. Demand growth outpaces price growth, so corresponding consumption rises smoothly over time and fossil fuels are exhausted after 83 years. 23 Gaudet et al. (2001) show how to generalize the Hotelling model to the case where the location of demanders (as well as reserve deposits) is exogenously distributed. In such a model, resources pools are sometimes accessed simultaneously by spatially distributed users even though the pools differ in extraction costs. Hassler et al. (2010) argue that monopoly power explains higher prices and simultaneous exploitation and may lead to incomplete exhaustion with the arrival of a backstop technology. Despite potentially greater realism, we declined to use such frameworks in our preliminary investigation, since the non-spatial competitive model has been used by nearly all the other contributors to the green paradox literature. Figure 8 displays the relationship between cumulative emissions and the length of time to switch to the backstop for the five-pool model. The emissions tax is time varying, rising at the interest rate. 24 As previously discussed, the transition trade-off curves for the conservation policies are independent of the policy growth path.
Simulated Transition Trade-off Curves under the Four Policies
With the greater number of pools, we notice that the (a) regimes in which the marginal pool is fully extracted are less pronounced than in the one-pool model, leading to a smoother relationship between the switchover timing and cumulative emissions. The difference between the backstop and emissions tax policies is also smaller. Indeed, average emissions are so similar, we find that an appreciable difference in the present value of damages under these two policies is highly unlikely. On the other hand, the energy efficiency and blend mandate policies greatly delay the arrival of the backstop. For more stringent targets, the extraction horizon is extended well beyond the current "fossil era," implying a substantial change in emissions patterns over time. 24 We also simulated a tax that rises at the rate of demand growth, but the difference was insignificant. For a given cumulative emissions, the slower growth tax path delays the switchover by less than 2 percent. We did not consider a fixed tax, since with the parameterized demand growth, the tax levels required to meet reduction targets would choke off demand in the early years. 
right-hand side is the product of two factors: (1) the reduction in emissions in response to policy i predicted by a model that takes no account of the induced change in scarcity rents; and (2) the complement of the simulated leakage rate. The left-hand side is the reduction in cumulative emissions under policy i predicted to occur after scarcity rents adjust. Thus, if a model that takes no account of the change in scarcity rents predicts that policy i will cut emissions by 20 tons and the simulated leakage rate for that policy is 60 percent, then after scarcity rents equilibrate we predict the policy will cut emissions by only 8 tons (40 percent of 20). From these simulations, we can calculate the average intertemporal leakage rates associated with a given level of cumulative emissions. We do this for a range of time-varying and stationary policies. Although policy paths have little influence on the backstop transition trade-offs, they can have a large influence on the leakage trade-offs, particularly for the conservation policies. Figures 11 and 12 depict these leakage trade-off curves. The horizontal segments in the diagram arise because an interval of stringencies inducing the same cumulative emissions will induce different leakage rates. Policies to the left have less leakage, on average. We see that all policies initially have 100 percent leakage, and that rate declines as cumulative emissions fall. Figure 10 compares the backstop policy with an emissions tax that rises at the rate of interest and an emissions tax that rises more slowly, at the rate of demand growth. The emissions tax policies have less leakage than the backstop policy initially, in part because of their ability to differentiate among higher emissions intensity pools. However, for more dramatic reductions, the backstop has lower leakage rates than the tax policies. Meanwhile, the slower tax path that is associated with somewhat more delay in the backstop transition has a consistently (though not 
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Leakage greatly) higher leakage rate than the emissions tax rising at the rate of interest. Particularly after the extraction of the highest-cost, highest-emitting pool is eliminated, the leakage rate differences among all three fall within 5 percentage points of each other. Figure 11 compares the leakage trade-off curves for two variants of each conservation policy, with the backstop policy as a reference. With "EE Fixed" and "Blend Fixed," we simulate the policies as described in the one-pool model: the mandates require an immediate and permanent improvement in energy efficiency (or similarly, a blend ratio). These policies have nearly identical effects and are associated with consistently higher leakage rates than all other policies. With "EE Growing" and "Blend Growing," we assume that the mandates require an annual rate of improvement in efficiency or the backstop blend. 26 We find that delay in raising the stringency of the conservation policies improves their performance with respect to intertemporal leakage. Although their leakage rates are still higher at more modest targets, they outperform the backstop and emissions tax at more ambitious reduction targets. 
Sensitivity
Ideally, the goal of policy would be to minimize the present value of emissions damages, net of the costs. However, there is considerable uncertainty over the evolution of the social cost of carbon over time, and therefore the benefits or costs of delay. 27 Given prior attention in the green paradox literature to the present value of emissions damages, we consider the same policy effects when the target is expressed in discounted cumulative emissions. 28 This metric is useful if one believes the social cost of carbon is basically constant over time, 29 whereas cumulative emissions are preferable if marginal damages are rising at the discount rate, or more generally if one is concerned about potential threshold effects and long lags in climatic response that require setting a cumulative emissions budget for the time period. If we map present value emissions against cumulative emissions, we see that the CO 2 tax and green backstop policy have nearly identical tradeoffs, while the conservation policies have much lower present value emissions. As 27 See Footnote 2. 28 We define present value emissions as the discounted flow of emissions, ie., . The present value leakage rate is then defined analogously to the cumulative emissions intertemporal leakage rate: Hoel (2012) gives assumptions that lead to this conclusion. We also perform sensitivity analysis with respect to some key parameters in the numerical simulations. First, we lower the elasticity of demand for fuel from -0.25 to -0.1, closer to short-run elasticity estimates. The initial switchover times are slightly delayed, and the difference between the backstop and tax policies in the transition trade-off curves are more compressed. However, the leakage rate trade-off curves are indistinguishable from the higher elasticity baseline. Second, we vary our assumptions about resource scarcity. If all reserves prove to be 50 percent larger than in the baseline, initial prices would be lower, transition horizons longer, and leakage rates smaller for modest targets, although the qualitative results are unchanged.
Finally, carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) has been proposed as one of the few viable options for addressing the green paradox, since it reduces emissions even while oil continues to be extracted and consumed (Sinn 2008 ). As such, it deserves some separate discussion, and we treat it formally in the Appendix. Essentially, a mandate requiring the equivalent of a certain share of emissions to be captured and sequestered functions like an implicit emissions tax. Thus, it has the same effect on the extraction path and price path as a corresponding carbon tax. However, since the tax revenues are used to buy sequestration, a given amount of extraction is associated with fewer emissions. The results indicate that although CCS does induce more emissions reductions than the equivalent carbon tax, its susceptibility to intertemporal leakage is not that different in magnitude.
Limitations for Welfare Analysis
Absent reliable estimates of the cost of accelerating the competitiveness of alternative fuels and the cost of permanently improving energy efficiency, we cannot conduct meaningful welfare or cost-effectiveness analyses. However, making a rough estimate of the policies needed to meet mitigation goals suggests the magnitudes of the potential costs.
Table compares the levels of policy stringency required to achieve given levels of extraction in the simulation model, depending on whether one accounts for intertemporal leakage. For example, when rents adjust, to avoid the emissions of the oil sands and shale reserves requires a $17/ton CO 2 tax (within the range of the European Union's Emission Trading Scheme allowance prices over the past year), or an increase in the rate of cost reductions in cellulosic biofuels by 1 percent per year, a 2.9 percent annual improvement in energy efficiency, or a 2.7 percent annual reduction in the share of fossil sources in the fuel blend. Ignoring leakage, one would expect these stringency levels to be one-third to one-half lower. Even with reliable cost estimates, additional limitations prevent us from performing a proper welfare analysis. In particular, there is considerable uncertainty about the shape of the damage function.
Conclusion
Climate change is a long-term problem, and since GHGs decay quite slowly, stabilizing their atmospheric concentrations requires something akin to a limit on cumulative emissions over the next century. "Green paradox" concerns take two main forms. One is that efforts to reduce GHG emissions may be undone in part or in whole by emissions leakage, not only across countries but also over time, given that the major sources of GHGs are exhaustible resources. A second concern is that, not only may emissions leak over time, but some efforts to spur a transition to clean energy may accelerate emissions in such a way that the present value of the damages of climate change may actually increase. However, for understanding the true extent of the green paradox, we find it important to isolate the effects of intertemporal leakage-that is, the change in emissions that can be attributed to market adjustments in scarcity rents-from the effects of the policies themselves on the timing of emissions. These supplier responses to anticipated changes in future fossil fuel demand are often lacking in climate policy models; intertemporal leakage rates can then indicate the degree to which such models are overly optimistic about policy effects and the costs of reaching emissions targets.
Our study reinforces earlier findings that, unlike demand-reducing strategies, accelerating cost reductions in a clean backstop technology tends also to accelerate extraction of nonrenewable resources. However, in a reasonably parameterized model of oil markets, the differences in outcomes between a green technology policy and an emissions tax seem unimportant. That is, given a cumulative emissions target, the two policies exhibit very similar backstop transition times and present value of emissions. Furthermore, in comparing the intertemporal leakage rates for cumulative emissions, we find the backstop policy can actually outperform other policy alternatives, including an emissions tax.
By contrast, energy efficiency improvements and clean energy blend mandates can significantly delay emissions and the adoption of the backstop technology (at least, they never accelerate that adoption). In our simulations, the delay that occurs as a result of rent adjustments is of a magnitude that the present value of emissions is likely to be affected if the social cost of carbon rises slowly. But if the greater concern is cumulative emissions, these conservation policies also suffer from considerable leakage rates, particularly if they mandate stringent action early on. Although all policies considered can reduce cumulative emissions under the right circumstances, the carbon capture and storage mandate is the only policy that does it in all circumstances-yet it, too, entails intertemporal leakage. For all of the policies, leakage rates are highest when policies are weak, but as reduction targets become more ambitious, leakage rates tend to fall.
We have noted some important simplifications in our analysis. Even with the given policies, additional assumptions would be needed to address questions of the relative costeffectiveness of meeting a given cumulative emissions target. We have not explicitly represented the costs of energy efficiency improvements, backstop technology policy, or carbon capture and storage. For example, although an energy efficiency policy may look attractive in terms of its ability to delay emissions, ultimately it will also depend on the costs of achieving the efficiency improvements at those scales; indeed, in our simple simulation model, to achieve more than modest reductions requires rapid reductions in energy demand. An emissions tax would be an efficient policy in the absence of market failures, but a fair evaluation of its costs and benefits relative to the other policies requires taking those market failures and barriers into account (see, e.g., Fischer and Newell 2008) . Nor in our parsing of the policy effects did we allow for emissions prices or energy price changes to induce investments in backstop or energy efficiency improvements or in carbon capture. In reality, climate policy will be a portfolio of options and responses. The research on intertemporal leakage indicates that this portfolio may need to be more ambitious than otherwise thought to reach emissions goals, but the efforts are not likely to be undone to the extent indicated by earlier studies. mineral carbonization), as well as monitoring and verification costs (IPCC 2010) . CCS from oil sands upgrading is likely to be on the costlier end; furthermore, it is limited to the energy used for upgrading, so a mandate of any larger magnitude would require purchasing sequestration credits from other sources. For our purposes, we assume a constant and fixed cost of $100 per ton sequestered, which falls within the admittedly large range of estimates.
Although CCS does induce more emissions reductions than the equivalent carbon tax, its susceptibility to intertemporal leakage is not that different in magnitude. It does perform better in the (a) regimes, however, particularly between oil shale and oil sands. 
